Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud¶
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973). Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud. The Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), 67-88.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Public Criteria Register
- A "Certified Sustainable" seafood seal only works if buyers trust it, because sustainability is a credence attribute — one a shopper cannot verify even after eating the fish.
This sourceDarby and Karni define credence qualities as attributes that remain costly for buyers to judge even after purchase and normal use.
- A "Certified Sustainable" seafood seal only works if buyers trust it, because sustainability is a credence attribute — one a shopper cannot verify even after eating the fish.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.
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