The Theory of Incentives¶
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Incentive
- Their characteristic failure modes — perverse incentives, gaming, crowding-out of intrinsic motivation, Goodhart drift — are symptoms of the same structural commitment: a payoff is attached to a proxy, and the population optimises for the proxy.
This sourceComprehensive treatment of incentive provision under hidden action and hidden information, including how payoffs attached to observable proxies drive agents to optimize the proxy.
- Their characteristic failure modes — perverse incentives, gaming, crowding-out of intrinsic motivation, Goodhart drift — are symptoms of the same structural commitment: a payoff is attached to a proxy, and the population optimises for the proxy.
- Screening
- An uninformed designer (employer, insurer, lender, buyer, regulator) who cannot directly observe agent types.
This sourceCanonical text developing the systematic reframing of governance and policy problems as incentive design under private information—structuring rules so self-interested behavior produces collective objectives rather than relying on direction or compliance.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The publisher's description of Laffont & Martimort (2002) presents principal-agent models under adverse selection — unobserved agent types — supporting the setup but not the listed designer roles.
“the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability.”
- An uninformed designer (employer, insurer, lender, buyer, regulator) who cannot directly observe agent types.
Verification¶
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