The Theory of Incentives¶
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Incentive
- Their characteristic failure modes — perverse incentives, gaming, crowding-out of intrinsic motivation, Goodhart drift — are symptoms of the same structural commitment: a payoff is attached to a proxy, and the population optimises for the proxy.
This sourceComprehensive treatment of incentive provision under hidden action and hidden information, including how payoffs attached to observable proxies drive agents to optimize the proxy.
- Their characteristic failure modes — perverse incentives, gaming, crowding-out of intrinsic motivation, Goodhart drift — are symptoms of the same structural commitment: a payoff is attached to a proxy, and the population optimises for the proxy.
- Screening
- An uninformed designer (employer, insurer, lender, buyer, regulator) who cannot directly observe agent types.
This sourceCanonical text developing the systematic reframing of governance and policy problems as incentive design under private information—structuring rules so self-interested behavior produces collective objectives rather than relying on direction or compliance.
- An uninformed designer (employer, insurer, lender, buyer, regulator) who cannot directly observe agent types.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:8fbcf6564e7c · see in the full table