Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information¶
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Folk Theorem (Repeated Games)
- This pattern matches the Green–Porter (1984) trigger-strategy account
This sourceThe model of a self-enforcing cartel under demand uncertainty and imperfect price information, the trigger-strategy account the JEC price wars are compared with.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- This pattern matches the Green–Porter (1984) trigger-strategy account
- Grim Trigger
- . Industrial organization and antitrust — grim-trigger collusion enforcing cartels (any price-cut triggers permanent reversion to competitive pricing), yielding the trigger-price analysis of when collusion collapses
This sourceA model of noncooperatively supported cartel self-enforcement under demand uncertainty, and the industry-structure conditions that make such a cartel viable.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
“This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.”
- . Industrial organization and antitrust — grim-trigger collusion enforcing cartels (any price-cut triggers permanent reversion to competitive pricing), yielding the trigger-price analysis of when collusion collapses
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This work's DOI is recorded above but has not been resolved against an external catalogue, so nothing here confirms the work exists.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:9139cb954ddb · see in the full table