The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians

Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E. (1999). The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. American Economic Review, 748-780.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1999

DOI

10.1257/aer.89.4.748

Link

https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism — Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) — the second-price sealed-bid auction, the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (Gale-Shapley 1962) for medical residency matching (Roth-Peranson 1999)
• Mechanism Design
  • In matching market design, it governs medical residency matching (NRMP since 1952; the Deferred Acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley 1962 redesigned for the NRMP by Roth and Peranson 1998

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