A Primer in Social Choice Theory¶
Gaertner, W. (2009). A Primer in Social Choice Theory. Oxford University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Axiomatic Incompatibility
- The resolution menu is exactly the form-level catalogue: restrict the domain (single-peaked preferences escape the theorem entirely, as the median-voter rule then satisfies the rest), relax an axiom (accept IIA violations and the attendant vulnerability to agenda-setting), or add information (cardinal utility, as in range voting, changes the domain and sidesteps the ordinal-only premise).
This sourceStandard treatment of escapes from Arrow's theorem, including single-peaked domain restriction and the role of cardinal information.
- The resolution menu is exactly the form-level catalogue: restrict the domain (single-peaked preferences escape the theorem entirely, as the median-voter rule then satisfies the rest), relax an axiom (accept IIA violations and the attendant vulnerability to agenda-setting), or add information (cardinal utility, as in range voting, changes the domain and sidesteps the ordinal-only premise).
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:91f3af1e6fc4 · see in the full table