Reversals of Preference in Allocation Decisions¶
Bazerman, M. H., Loewenstein, G. F., & White, S. B. (1992). Reversals of Preference in Allocation Decisions: Judging an Alternative versus Choosing among Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 220-240.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Joint vs. Separate Evaluation
- Peer review and policy evaluation: rating papers one at a time against an absolute scale yields different orderings than ranking them as a slate, and a program's cost-effectiveness ratio evaluated alone against a threshold differs from the same ratio evaluated head-to-head against competing programs. Negotiation: issue-by-issue (sequential separate) versus package (joint) negotiation activates different reference points, and integrative gains usually require joint mode because cross-issue trade-offs are only evaluable when issues sit together.
This sourceDemonstrates joint–separate reversals in evaluation, supporting the negotiation point that integrative trade-offs require joint mode.
- Peer review and policy evaluation: rating papers one at a time against an absolute scale yields different orderings than ranking them as a slate, and a program's cost-effectiveness ratio evaluated alone against a threshold differs from the same ratio evaluated head-to-head against competing programs. Negotiation: issue-by-issue (sequential separate) versus package (joint) negotiation activates different reference points, and integrative gains usually require joint mode because cross-issue trade-offs are only evaluable when issues sit together.
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