The Logic of Animal Conflict.¶
SMITH, J. M., & PRICE, G. R. (1973). The Logic of Animal Conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Anti-Coordination Game
- In evolutionary biology, Hawk-Dove is the original evolutionarily-stable-strategy model of animal conflict, predicting stable polymorphisms
This sourceIntroduces the Hawk-Dove game and the evolutionarily stable strategy, predicting a stable polymorphism with mixed equilibrium at Hawk-probability V/C.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The Nature abstract backs only the general frame that game theory explains animal-conflict strategy; it never names Hawk-Dove, Chicken, Snowdrift, ESS, or stable polymorphisms.
“Game theory and computer simulation analyses show, however, that a “limited war” strategy benefits individual animals as well as the species.”
- In evolutionary biology, Hawk-Dove is the original evolutionarily-stable-strategy model of animal conflict, predicting stable polymorphisms
- Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- Formally, strategy S is an ESS if for any alternative T, either S strictly outperforms T against itself, or S ties against itself and strictly outperforms T against T.
This sourceIntroduces the evolutionarily stable strategy and the invasion-test definition: a resident strategy that no rare mutant can invade.
- Formally, strategy S is an ESS if for any alternative T, either S strictly outperforms T against itself, or S ties against itself and strictly outperforms T against T.
- Game-Theoretic Strategy
- … dominant-strategy equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential games, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for incomplete-information games, trembling-hand-perfect or sequential equilibrium for refinements; and (4) the strategic context that makes the strategy optimal — best-response dynamics, evolutionary stability
This source(The originating treatment of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) — a strategy that, when adopted by the resident population, cannot be invaded by any rare alternative strategy. The 1973 Nature paper introduces the concept via the hawk–dove game; the 1982 monograph develops the framework as a comprehensive evolutionary game theory. The ESS reframes equilibrium analysis from rational-choice to selection-driven foundations, with applications across animal-behaviour, sex-ratio theory, and the evolution of cooperation.)
- … dominant-strategy equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential games, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for incomplete-information games, trembling-hand-perfect or sequential equilibrium for refinements; and (4) the strategic context that makes the strategy optimal — best-response dynamics, evolutionary stability
- Nash Equilibrium
- Nash certifies stability of a profile; it does not by itself predict which equilibrium obtains. Not Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. The ESS is a Refinement of Nash for evolutionary dynamics (stable against mutant invasion); every ESS is Nash but not conversely, so naming a profile "Nash" is weaker than naming it evolutionarily stable.
This sourceIntroduces the evolutionarily stable strategy, a refinement of Nash equilibrium stable against invasion by mutant strategies, with the hawk-dove game.
- Nash certifies stability of a profile; it does not by itself predict which equilibrium obtains. Not Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. The ESS is a Refinement of Nash for evolutionary dynamics (stable against mutant invasion); every ESS is Nash but not conversely, so naming a profile "Nash" is weaker than naming it evolutionarily stable.
Domain-specific¶
- Matching pennies
- . Sport economics — penalty kicks (kicker versus goalkeeper), where professionals are observed to play very close to the implied mixed equilibrium (Palacios-Huerta). Inspection games — tax audits, drug tests, and security patrols, where the inspector's probability is set to make the cheater indifferent and vice versa. Pursuit-evasion — aerial combat, search-and-hide, and predator-prey under perfect monitoring, the kernel zero-sum anti-coordination model. Evolutionary biology — hawk-dove and other anti-coordination payoffs whose evolutionarily stable strategy is the mixed equilibrium
This sourceThe paper that introduced evolutionarily stable strategies, showing by game theory and computer simulation that 'limited war' conduct benefits individual animals and not only the species, and the earliest presentation of a form of the Hawk-Dove payoff structure; its own stable strategy is the conditional Retaliator, and the mixed ESS is later work (Maynard Smith 1982).
Supported in partVerified against the source
- . Sport economics — penalty kicks (kicker versus goalkeeper), where professionals are observed to play very close to the implied mixed equilibrium (Palacios-Huerta). Inspection games — tax audits, drug tests, and security patrols, where the inspector's probability is set to make the cheater indifferent and vice versa. Pursuit-evasion — aerial combat, search-and-hide, and predator-prey under perfect monitoring, the kernel zero-sum anti-coordination model. Evolutionary biology — hawk-dove and other anti-coordination payoffs whose evolutionarily stable strategy is the mixed equilibrium
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 5 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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