Veto Players¶
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Checks and Balances
- Checks and balances do not distribute power equally; instead, as Tsebelis (2002) argues in his veto-player framework, they create asymmetric interdependencies where one actor can obstruct another's agenda without controlling outcomes directly.
This sourceDevelops a unified theory in which the capacity to change the status quo is set by the number, ideological distance, and internal cohesion of veto players; shows that nominally separate actors collapse into a single effective veto player when their preferences align — directly applicable to boards captured by the executives they nominally oversee.
- Checks and balances do not distribute power equally; instead, as Tsebelis (2002) argues in his veto-player framework, they create asymmetric interdependencies where one actor can obstruct another's agenda without controlling outcomes directly.
- Separation of Powers
- However, board members are often selected by the CEO being overseen, creating circularity—a veto-player problem in the sense developed by Tsebelis (2002), where the effective number of independent veto players collapses if nominally separate actors share preferences induced by selection or patronage, leaving formal separation without restraining force.
This sourceDevelops a unified theory in which institutional capacity to change the status quo is determined by the number, ideological distance, and internal cohesion of veto players; shows that nominally separate actors collapse into a single effective veto player when selection or party discipline aligns their preferences—directly applicable to corporate boards captured by the executives they nominally oversee.
- However, board members are often selected by the CEO being overseen, creating circularity—a veto-player problem in the sense developed by Tsebelis (2002), where the effective number of independent veto players collapses if nominally separate actors share preferences induced by selection or patronage, leaving formal separation without restraining force.
Mechanisms¶
- Federated Governance Cadence
- Its failure mode is paralysis: give too many parties an effective veto and provide no decision rule, and the body becomes negotiation theater that never converges — the more actors whose assent is required, the harder any change becomes
This sourceDevelops the veto-player result that requiring assent from more actors increases policy stability and makes change harder.
- Its failure mode is paralysis: give too many parties an effective veto and provide no decision rule, and the body becomes negotiation theater that never converges — the more actors whose assent is required, the harder any change becomes
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.
Registry ID ref:9390675f33ec · see in the full table