Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values¶
Kagel, Harstad, & Levin. (1987). Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study.
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Domain-specific¶
- Vickrey Auction
- The Generalised Second-Price keyword auction superficially resembles Vickrey but is not strategy-proof in the multi-slot case; "looks second-price" does not make a format truthful. Not a guarantee that bidders actually bid their true value. Truthful bidding is a theoretical dominant strategy, not an observed behavioral regularity: under explicit Vickrey rules bidders reliably over-bid, as if treating their bid as the price.
This sourceThat bidders in second-price sealed-bid auctions reliably bid above their true value, so dominant-strategy truthfulness is not an observed behavioural regularity.
- The Generalised Second-Price keyword auction superficially resembles Vickrey but is not strategy-proof in the multi-slot case; "looks second-price" does not make a format truthful. Not a guarantee that bidders actually bid their true value. Truthful bidding is a theoretical dominant strategy, not an observed behavioral regularity: under explicit Vickrey rules bidders reliably over-bid, as if treating their bid as the price.
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