The design of mechanisms for resource allocation

Hurwicz, L. (1973). The design of mechanisms for resource allocation. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 1-30.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1973

Volume

63

Issue

2

Pages

1-30

Link

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1817047

Cited from

biology_ecology, economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Competition
  • Reframing a messy multi-actor situation as a competition thus converts an open-ended behavioral question into a structural-design question with a tractable set of knobs.
• Incentive Compatibility
  • argued in his AER survey on resource-allocation mechanisms, IC design collapses this by using each agent's self-interest as the enforcement mechanism.

    This sourceFoundational mechanism-design statement that allocation outcomes can be reshaped by altering the rules and incentive structure of a resource contest — the basis for treating intervention in a competitive system as structural design over a tractable set of levers.

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