The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1996). The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information. Economic Theory, 8(2), 291-305.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1996

DOI

10.1007/bf01211819

Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211819

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• War Of Attrition
  • The all-pay auction, in which each bidder pays its bid whether or not it wins, is the discrete-bid limit of the same mechanism and produces analogous dissipation.

    This sourceCharacterizes all-pay auction equilibria, in which expended bids dissipate the prize — the discrete-bid analogue of attrition dissipation.

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Registry ID ref:989377e8263e · see in the full table