The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information¶
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1996). The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information. Economic Theory, 8(2), 291-305.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- War Of Attrition
- The all-pay auction, in which each bidder pays its bid whether or not it wins, is the discrete-bid limit of the same mechanism and produces analogous dissipation.
This sourceCharacterizes all-pay auction equilibria, in which expended bids dissipate the prize — the discrete-bid analogue of attrition dissipation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract defines the all-pay auction as one where all bidders forfeit their bids, backing the definitional clause only; it says nothing of a war-of-attrition limit or of dissipation.
“In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item.”
- The all-pay auction, in which each bidder pays its bid whether or not it wins, is the discrete-bid limit of the same mechanism and produces analogous dissipation.
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