The Consequences of Regulatory Accumulation and a Proposed Solution.¶
McLaughlin, P. A., & Greene, R. (2014). The Consequences of Regulatory Accumulation and a Proposed Solution.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
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Primes¶
- Additive Bias
- In legal and regulatory regimes it is the monotonic growth of statutes and codes, where repeal is far costlier than enactment.
This sourceDocuments the monotonic growth of US federal regulatory restrictions (RegData: ~400,000 restrictive words in the Code of Federal Regulations in 1970 rising to over 1 million), evidencing regulatory accretion and the asymmetric cost of repeal versus enactment.
- In legal and regulatory regimes it is the monotonic growth of statutes and codes, where repeal is far costlier than enactment.
- Technical Debt
- Regulatory and institutional policy — rules accumulated without consolidation, approval processes never reformed, institutional knowledge that lives only in long-tenured staff.
This sourceRegulations build up over time because no systematic process reviews them for obsolescence; the burden of the accumulated stock exceeds the sum of individual rules — accumulated rules as a compounding liability.
- Regulatory and institutional policy — rules accumulated without consolidation, approval processes never reformed, institutional knowledge that lives only in long-tenured staff.
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