The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Smith, A. (1759). The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Type

Book chapter

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1759

DOI registrant

Oxford University Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00042831matched

Cited from

philosophy, sociology_anthropology

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Impartiality
  • Impartiality is the structural property of a judgment, decision, allocation, or estimate that it depends only on relevant features of the case and is invariant under the identity of the party involved — like cases are treated alike, and who a party is (as opposed to what is relevantly true of them) makes no systematic difference to the outcome.

    This sourceA. Millar. Foundational statement of the impartial spectator: a judgment is morally appropriate when it would be approved by a well-informed observer who has no personal stake in the case — the prototype of impartiality as identity-invariant evaluation.

• Unintended consequences
  • Its autonomous core is intent-action outcome mismatch produced through real causal propagation, broader than off-interface side effects and distinct from accidental actions, unrelated coincidences or merely disliked intended tradeoffs.

Verification

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