Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets.¶
Milgrom, P., & Segal, I. (2002). Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets. Econometrica, 70(2), 583-601.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Comparative Statics
- Envelope reasoning: when the equilibrium is the maximizer of an objective, the response of the maximized value to a parameter is simply the partial derivative of the objective at the optimum, because the indirect effects through the optimal action cancel — a re-usable shortcut that appears wherever an equilibrium is the solution to an optimization.
This sourceGeneralizes the envelope theorem — the response of a maximized value to a parameter is the partial derivative of the objective at the optimum. (
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Supports the envelope formula (derivative of the maximized value equals the objective's partial derivative at the optimum) and its use for equilibrium utilities, but not the 'indirect effects cancel' intuition.
“Firstweshowthatthetraditionalenvelope formulaholdsatanydif-ferentiabilitypointofthevaluefunction.”
- Envelope reasoning: when the equilibrium is the maximizer of an objective, the response of the maximized value to a parameter is simply the partial derivative of the objective at the optimum, because the indirect effects through the optimal action cancel — a re-usable shortcut that appears wherever an equilibrium is the solution to an optimization.
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