Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.¶
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Free Riding
- Fehr and Gächter (2000) demonstrated experimentally that altruistic punishment—peer sanctioning of non-contributors—sharply increases cooperation rates, providing direct empirical support for design-based rather than moralistic interventions.
This sourceExperimental demonstration that peer-punishment opportunities sharply raise voluntary contributions; directly supports the claim that altruistic punishment increases cooperation and grounds design-based interventions.
- Fehr and Gächter (2000) demonstrated experimentally that altruistic punishment—peer sanctioning of non-contributors—sharply increases cooperation rates, providing direct empirical support for design-based rather than moralistic interventions.
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