Zero Trust Architecture (NIST Special Publication 800-207)¶
Rose, S., Borchert, O., Mitchell, S., & Connelly, S. (2020). Zero Trust Architecture (NIST Special Publication 800-207).
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Eventual Realisation of Possibility
- Defensive doctrine assumes any vulnerability deployed at scale will eventually be found, which is why "assume breach" and blast-radius containment displace per-attempt prevention as the organising posture — catalogue the failure modes, require independent layers (defence-in-depth), and accept that perimeter prevention alone is a per-trial argument applied to a many-trial reality.
This sourceCodifies the 'assume breach' doctrine — treat the network as compromised and design for containment rather than perimeter prevention — the security analogue of designing for the certain eventual discovery of a deployed vulnerability.
- Defensive doctrine assumes any vulnerability deployed at scale will eventually be found, which is why "assume breach" and blast-radius containment displace per-attempt prevention as the organising posture — catalogue the failure modes, require independent layers (defence-in-depth), and accept that perimeter prevention alone is a per-trial argument applied to a many-trial reality.
- Principle of Least Privilege
- In network and zero-trust architecture, it appears as per-service credentials, micro-segmentation, and just-in-time privilege elevation.
This sourceDefines per-request access, micro-segmentation, and just-in-time least-privilege elevation.
- In network and zero-trust architecture, it appears as per-service credentials, micro-segmentation, and just-in-time privilege elevation.
- Trusted Intermediary Compromise
- The insider-threat model from espionage ported into zero-trust corporate architectures that explicitly assume trusted-channel compromise is always possible.
This sourceFormalizes the zero-trust assumption that any channel or insider may be compromised, requiring per-request verification.
- The insider-threat model from espionage ported into zero-trust corporate architectures that explicitly assume trusted-channel compromise is always possible.
Domain-specific¶
Mechanisms¶
- Network Segmentation Policy
- Its strength is turning total loss into partial loss: it caps how far any one compromise travels, and each boundary an attacker must cross buys detection and response time on the way to what matters.
This sourceStates that zero-trust architecture aims to minimize or prevent lateral movement after a host is compromised.
- Its strength is turning total loss into partial loss: it caps how far any one compromise travels, and each boundary an attacker must cross buys detection and response time on the way to what matters.
Verification¶
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