The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods¶
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Free Riding
- Tax evasion, undersupply of public education, underfunding of national defense, and the problem of pharmaceutical innovation (high R&D cost, easy generic replication) all instantiate free-riding incentives, a domain Cornes and Sandler (1996) survey systematically across pure, impure, and club goods.
This sourceSystematic treatment of pure, impure, and club goods covering tax compliance, defense, education, and R&D underprovision; supports the broad-use survey claim across public-goods instances.
- Tax evasion, undersupply of public education, underfunding of national defense, and the problem of pharmaceutical innovation (high R&D cost, easy generic replication) all instantiate free-riding incentives, a domain Cornes and Sandler (1996) survey systematically across pure, impure, and club goods.
- Public Goods
This sourceComprehensive treatment of free-riding in pure public goods, impure public goods, and club goods; covers tax compliance, defense, education, and R&D as canonical instances of underprovision.
Verification¶
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