Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions

Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975). Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 187-217.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1975

Pages

187-217

ISSN

0022-0531

DOI

10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2

DOI registrant

Elsevier

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility

  • This sourceSecond half of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

• Mechanism Design
  • Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975

    This sourceSecond half of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

Domain-specific

• Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
  • If \(f\) is onto and truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for every voter, then \(f\) is dictatorial: there is one fixed voter whose top-ranked alternative is always selected.

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