Auction Theory¶
Klemperer, P. (1999). Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(3), 227-286.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- Auction Theory studies the abstraction that (1) different auction formats — English ascending, Dutch descending, sealed-bid first-price, sealed-bid second-price, double auctions, combinatorial auctions — (2) induce different equilibrium bidding strategies from rational agents with private valuations, risk preferences, and information structures, (3) producing systematically different outcomes in allocative efficiency, revenue to the seller, information revelation, and robustness to collusion, so that (4) auction choice is a design variable, not a neutral administrative detail, with predictable and often quantifiable consequences, as Klemperer (1999) surveys in his guide to the auction-theory literature.
This sourceSurvey of auction theory (optimal auctions, revenue equivalence, affiliation, collusion, entry)
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Klemperer's survey abstract covers optimal auctions, revenue equivalence, risk-aversion, affiliation, collusion, and double auctions, but does not itself state the design-variable conclusion.
“We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk‐aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics.”
- Auction Theory studies the abstraction that (1) different auction formats — English ascending, Dutch descending, sealed-bid first-price, sealed-bid second-price, double auctions, combinatorial auctions — (2) induce different equilibrium bidding strategies from rational agents with private valuations, risk preferences, and information structures, (3) producing systematically different outcomes in allocative efficiency, revenue to the seller, information revelation, and robustness to collusion, so that (4) auction choice is a design variable, not a neutral administrative detail, with predictable and often quantifiable consequences, as Klemperer (1999) surveys in his guide to the auction-theory literature.
- Winner's Curse
- The vocabulary of "conditioning on winning" gives practitioners in one field a ready handle on problems that specialists in another field discovered first.
This sourceSurvey of auction theory establishing that the common-value bid-shading correction transfers across applied settings — including procurement, where the sign inverts to a cost-underestimate and the defensive correction is to bid higher — with the required adjustment scaling in the size of the bidding field.
- The vocabulary of "conditioning on winning" gives practitioners in one field a ready handle on problems that specialists in another field discovered first.
Verification¶
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