What Have We Learned from Market Design?

Roth, A. E. (2008). What Have We Learned from Market Design?. The Economic Journal, 118(527), 285-310.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2008

Volume

118

Issue

527

Pages

285-310

ISSN

1468-0297

DOI

10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.x

DOI registrant

Oxford University Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.x

Cited from

biology_ecology

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Carrying Capacity
  • In economics and platform design, matching capacity, liquidity ceilings, and traffic volume before flow collapse all show the same signature.

    This sourceArgues that marketplaces must provide thickness while overcoming the congestion that thickness brings; markets work well only when thick, uncongested, and safe — supplying the matching-capacity / liquidity-ceiling-before-flow-collapse signature.

Mechanisms

• Decentralized Volunteer Matching
  • It is a matching market — its value rises with the liquidity of both sides

    This sourceExplains that a marketplace works better when it attracts enough potential participants to be sufficiently thick.

Verification

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