Monopoly and Product Quality.

Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and Product Quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18(2), 301-317.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1978

Volume

18

Issue

2

Pages

301-317

ISSN

0022-0531

DOI

10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6

DOI registrant

Elsevier

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Price Discrimination
  • Formally, second-degree discrimination is a mechanism-design problem: the seller designs a menu \(\{(q_i, t_i)\}\) of quality-payment pairs such that each buyer-type prefers their designated pair to any other pair, subject to individual rationality — the classical Screening problem (Mussa-Rosen 1978 for quality-differentiated goods, Maskin-Riley 1984 for quantity-differentiated goods).

    This sourceContinuous-type screening with quality-differentiated goods; introduced ironing and bunching techniques that became standard for second-degree price discrimination.

• Screening
  • T1: Revelation Power vs Downward Distortion Cost.

    This sourceContinuous-type screening with quality-differentiated goods; introduced ironing and bunching techniques that became standard for second-degree price discrimination.

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