The economist as engineer¶
Roth, A. E. (2002). The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica, 70(4), 1341-1378.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Allocation
- Recognizing the shared structure imports the diagnostic toolkit, a porting Roth (2002) demonstrates explicitly when he applies market-design tools developed for auctions to medical-residency and organ-exchange allocation.
This sourceFrames market and auction design as engineering practice converting agents' private information into allocations; draws centrally on the National Resident Matching Program (medical-residency allocation) and FCC spectrum auctions. SUPPORTS the claim that Roth applies market-design tools to medical-residency allocation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract confirms the paper draws on the NRMP (medical-residency matching) and FCC spectrum auctions and frames design as engineering, but says nothing about organ-exchange allocation.
“Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design.”
- Recognizing the shared structure imports the diagnostic toolkit, a porting Roth (2002) demonstrates explicitly when he applies market-design tools developed for auctions to medical-residency and organ-exchange allocation.
- Auction Theory
- The deeper pattern is that auction format is a machinery for converting private information and risk preferences into allocations and payments, the engineering perspective Roth (2002) advances in his Econometrica "economist as engineer" address on market design.
This sourceFrames market/auction design as engineering in which mechanisms convert private information and preferences into allocations and payments.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Roth's abstract backs the engineering frame — market design needs an engineering approach, spectrum auctions among its cases — but not the clause on converting private information and risk preferences into allocations.
“Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach. Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design.”
- The deeper pattern is that auction format is a machinery for converting private information and risk preferences into allocations and payments, the engineering perspective Roth (2002) advances in his Econometrica "economist as engineer" address on market design.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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