The Market for Catastrophe Risk

Froot, K. A. (2001). The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination. Journal of Financial Economics, 60(2), 2-3.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2001

DOI

10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00052-6

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00052-6

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Risk Transfer
  • Catastrophic systemic risk cannot in general be transferred because no counterparty is large enough, which is precisely the structural pressure that converts private catastrophic risks into public ones, transferring them to sovereigns as the ultimate backstop.

    This sourceShows catastrophic systemic risk resists private transfer because no counterparty is large enough, pushing such risk toward public backstops.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:a3924bab0321 · see in the full table