The Market for Catastrophe Risk¶
Froot, K. A. (2001). The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination. Journal of Financial Economics, 60(2), 2-3.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Risk Transfer
- Catastrophic systemic risk cannot in general be transferred because no counterparty is large enough, which is precisely the structural pressure that converts private catastrophic risks into public ones, transferring them to sovereigns as the ultimate backstop.
This sourceShows catastrophic systemic risk resists private transfer because no counterparty is large enough, pushing such risk toward public backstops.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Froot documents government ex-post disaster funding and possible reinsurance capacity shortfalls, but does not argue that no counterparty is large enough so risk is forced onto sovereigns.
“The federal government cannot credibly commit not to fund disasters after the fact”
- Catastrophic systemic risk cannot in general be transferred because no counterparty is large enough, which is precisely the structural pressure that converts private catastrophic risks into public ones, transferring them to sovereigns as the ultimate backstop.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:a3924bab0321 · see in the full table