The 'Ratchet Principle' and Performance Incentives

Weitzman, M. L. (1980). The 'Ratchet Principle' and Performance Incentives.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1980

Link

https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/weitzman/files/rachetprincipleperformanceincentives.pdf

Cited from

decision_science

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Reference-Point Dependence
  • Independent settability holds, and is exactly the problem: the committee moves the origin without moving anything the rep delivers.

    This sourceModels the ratchet effect in which the principal resets the next period's target upward from realized performance.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:a4498d453dfa · see in the full table