Behavioral Game Theory¶
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Other-Regarding Preferences
- In behavioural game theory, its canonical home, dictator-game donations to anonymous recipients, ultimatum-game rejections of unfair offers, trust-game investments, public-goods contributions, and third-party costly punishment each surface a specific signed dependence and estimate its parameters, because the own-payoff-only special case fails systematically and predictively.
This sourceSurveys dictator, ultimatum, trust, public-goods, and third-party-punishment games where own-payoff-only predictions fail systematically.
- In behavioural game theory, its canonical home, dictator-game donations to anonymous recipients, ultimatum-game rejections of unfair offers, trust-game investments, public-goods contributions, and third-party costly punishment each surface a specific signed dependence and estimate its parameters, because the own-payoff-only special case fails systematically and predictively.
Domain-specific¶
- Beauty Contest Game
- Comparative-statics prediction — what moves the level. Because reasoning depth is a single quantity, the analyst predicts how it shifts with conditions: it rises with stakes, with experience under repeated play, and with expertise (professional traders play deeper than undergraduates)
This sourceCamerer's survey of p-beauty-contest results across subject pools, showing choices drifting toward zero with learning and only a small effect of quadrupling the prize.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- Comparative-statics prediction — what moves the level. Because reasoning depth is a single quantity, the analyst predicts how it shifts with conditions: it rises with stakes, with experience under repeated play, and with expertise (professional traders play deeper than undergraduates)
- Guess 2/3 of the Average
- Experimental populations consistently cluster at levels 1 and 2, well above the equilibrium of zero.
This sourceThe book reports a beauty-contest experiment in which choices spike at the one-step (33) and two-step (22) answers well above the zero equilibrium; the text checked does not show that this pattern holds consistently across experimental populations.
Supported in partVerified against a saved copy of the source
“subjects chose either 33 (one step of reasoning from the midpoint of 50) or 22 (two steps)”
- Experimental populations consistently cluster at levels 1 and 2, well above the equilibrium of zero.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:a491e784e082 · see in the full table