Sameness and Substance Renewed¶
Wiggins, D. (2001). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Equivalence Relation
- Philosophy uses equivalence-relation reasoning in the analysis of identity-of-indiscernibles and of operational definitions, in the metaphysical framework Wiggins (2001) develops around sortal-relative sameness.
This sourceUpdated metaphysics of identity and individuation; develops sortal-relative sameness, the identity-of-indiscernibles principle, and operational-definition framing (arguing, against Geach, that identity is absolute).
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The publisher abstract shows Wiggins 2001 as a metaphysics of identity and individuation, but it never mentions equivalence relations, identity-of-indiscernibles, operational definitions, or sortal-relative sameness.
“he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism”
- Philosophy uses equivalence-relation reasoning in the analysis of identity-of-indiscernibles and of operational definitions, in the metaphysical framework Wiggins (2001) develops around sortal-relative sameness.
- Identity (philosophy)
- Identity-Providing Kind
- Modeling a temporary status as the identity-providing kind predicts absurdities: that an instance ceases to exist when the status ends, that ending a relationship annihilates one of its parties, that an office-holder and the human are one entity with the consequence that the human pre-dates their own existence or vanishes on leaving the post.
This sourceCanonical sortal theory: substance-sortals supply persistence criteria across phase-sortals an instance merely passes through, with the cease-to-exist test distinguishing kind from phase (e.g. 'human being' versus 'child'/'student').
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Supplies only a publisher abstract: it confirms Wiggins defends an 'individuative essentialism' about identity and persistence through change, but says nothing about sortals, the kind/phase distinction, or a cease-to-exist test.
“certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past”
- Modeling a temporary status as the identity-providing kind predicts absurdities: that an instance ceases to exist when the status ends, that ending a relationship annihilates one of its parties, that an office-holder and the human are one entity with the consequence that the human pre-dates their own existence or vanishes on leaving the post.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 3 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.
Registry ID ref:a4c7480c7b70 · see in the full table