Achieving cooperation under anarchy¶
Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226-254.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Cooperation
- Political science: international treaty compliance, collective security, and arms-control regimes maintained despite each state's incentive to renege; the analysis of how anarchy can nonetheless support cooperation.
This sourceArgues treaty compliance / collective security can be sustained despite each state's incentive to renege, via mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and institutions.
- Political science: international treaty compliance, collective security, and arms-control regimes maintained despite each state's incentive to renege; the analysis of how anarchy can nonetheless support cooperation.
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Registry ID ref:a8f31b827173 · see in the full table