Achieving cooperation under anarchy¶
Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226-254.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Cooperation
- Political science: international treaty compliance, collective security, and arms-control regimes maintained despite each state's incentive to renege; the analysis of how anarchy can nonetheless support cooperation.
This sourceArgues treaty compliance / collective security can be sustained despite each state's incentive to renege, via mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and institutions.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The paper's title and abstract establish cooperation under anarchy through mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and institutions, but not treaty compliance, collective security or arms control.
“Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players.”
- Political science: international treaty compliance, collective security, and arms-control regimes maintained despite each state's incentive to renege; the analysis of how anarchy can nonetheless support cooperation.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:a8f31b827173 · see in the full table