Platform design biases in ad-funded two-sided markets.

Choi, J. P., & Jeon, D. (2023). Platform design biases in ad-funded two-sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 54(2), 240-267.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2023

DOI

10.1111/1756-2171.12436

Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12436

Cited from

political_science

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Severed Accountability Via Unearned Revenue
  • The contrast case proves the geometry: a subscriber-funded platform, paid directly by users, has the coupling intact and optimizes for user satisfaction.

    This sourceShows that whether a platform is funded by advertisers or able to charge users directly systematically biases its design choices toward the paying side — the formal contrast between advertiser-funded platforms (serving advertisers) and subscriber-funded ones (serving users).

Verification

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