Social norms and community enforcement¶
Kandori, M. (1992). Social norms and community enforcement. The Review of Economic Studies, 59(1), 63-80.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Reputation
- Because defection is observed and propagated to future counterparties, the threat of reputational loss can sustain cooperation without any external enforcer, as in the community-enforcement equilibria Kandori (1992) proved can support cooperation in large populations whose members rarely meet the same partner twice.
This sourceProves that community enforcement can sustain cooperation in large populations whose members rarely meet the same partner twice.
- Because defection is observed and propagated to future counterparties, the threat of reputational loss can sustain cooperation without any external enforcer, as in the community-enforcement equilibria Kandori (1992) proved can support cooperation in large populations whose members rarely meet the same partner twice.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:aa0c26e9da01 · see in the full table