Non-Cooperative Games.¶
Nash, J. (1951). Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286-295.
Cited by¶
4 citations across 4 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Cooperation
- The defining commitment is the tension between collective optimum and individual incentive: cooperation exists only where the socially best move is not the privately dominant one, so the pattern is always about what sustains contribution against the pull of defection.
This sourceProves existence of equilibrium in finite non-cooperative games — a stable point where no agent gains by deviating unilaterally — formalizing how a collective optimum can diverge from each agent's dominant strategy.
- The defining commitment is the tension between collective optimum and individual incentive: cooperation exists only where the socially best move is not the privately dominant one, so the pattern is always about what sustains contribution against the pull of defection.
- Mixed Strategy
- In game theory and economics the Nash equilibria of zero-sum games with no pure-strategy equilibrium — matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors — exist only in mixed strategies, and bidding randomization is a recognized auction tactic.
This sourceProves every finite game has an equilibrium, possibly only in mixed strategies; zero-sum games without a pure equilibrium (matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors) have equilibria only in mixed strategies.
- In game theory and economics the Nash equilibria of zero-sum games with no pure-strategy equilibrium — matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors — exist only in mixed strategies, and bidding randomization is a recognized auction tactic.
- Nash Equilibrium
- This existence result is the foundational theorem of non-cooperative game theory.
This sourceThe foundational paper defining the Nash equilibrium concept for non-cooperative games and establishing its existence — the founding theorem of non-cooperative game theory.
- This existence result is the foundational theorem of non-cooperative game theory.
Domain-specific¶
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