Action Bias among Elite Soccer Goalkeepers¶
Bar-Eli, M., Azar, O. H., Ritov, I., Keidar-Levin, Y., & Schein, G. (2007). Action Bias among Elite Soccer Goalkeepers: The Case of Penalty Kicks. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(5), 606-621.
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Primes¶
- Action Bias
- In sports it is the penalty-kick goalkeeper who dives left or right even though staying central has the highest empirical save rate — the dive is more "active" and more defensible if a goal is scored.
This sourceEmpirical analysis of 286 penalty kicks showing goalkeepers almost always dive though staying central yields the highest expected save rate, attributed via norm theory to the norm favoring action over inaction.
SupportedVerified against the work's full text
Bar-Eli et al. show staying central had the highest stopping rate yet goalkeepers jump 93.7% of the time, explaining it by the worse feeling after a goal scored following inaction.
“the optimal strategy for goalkeepers is to stay in the goal's center. Goalkeepers, however, almost always jump right or left.”
- In sports it is the penalty-kick goalkeeper who dives left or right even though staying central has the highest empirical save rate — the dive is more "active" and more defensible if a goal is scored.
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