Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

Nisan, N., & Ronen, A. (1999). Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 1999), 129-140.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1999

Pages

129-140

DOI

10.1145/301250.301287

DOI registrant

Association for Computing Machinery

Link

https://doi.org/10.1145/301250.301287

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • now influencing platform-scale auction and allocation designs from ad networks to spectrum auctions.

    This sourceFounding paper of algorithmic mechanism design.

• Mechanism Design
  • This field adds computational tractability constraints to classical mechanism design, often accepting approximation to maintain implementability.

    This sourceFounding paper of algorithmic mechanism design.

    Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

    The abstract applies mechanism-design tools to algorithmic problems and reports an approximation mechanism, backing the field's frame but not the general tractability claim.

    “We apply the standard tools of mechanism design to algorithmic problems and in particular to the shortest path problem.”

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

Verification

Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.

Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 2 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790 ×2

Registry ID ref:ab2f81ed9de1 · see in the full table