Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

Nisan, N., & Ronen, A. (1999). Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 1999), 1-2.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1999

DOI

10.1145/301250.301287

Link

https://doi.org/10.1145/301250.301287

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • now influencing platform-scale auction and allocation designs from ad networks to spectrum auctions.

    This sourceFounding paper of algorithmic mechanism design.

• Mechanism Design
  • This field adds computational tractability constraints to classical mechanism design, often accepting approximation to maintain implementability.

    This sourceFounding paper of algorithmic mechanism design.

Verification

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790 ×2

Registry ID ref:ab2f81ed9de1 · see in the full table