Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy¶
Burby, R. J. (2006). Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 171-191.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Benign-Sampling Safety Drift
- The hundred-year flood does not come for thirty years, so the dry sample is read as safety; development fills the floodplain, the levee is not raised, deferred maintenance is accepted because "it held last year"
This sourceThe "safe development paradox": levees and dry decades read as safety license floodplain encroachment and deferred maintenance until a rare high-water event finds the spent margin.
- The hundred-year flood does not come for thirty years, so the dry sample is read as safety; development fills the floodplain, the levee is not raised, deferred maintenance is accepted because "it held last year"
Mechanisms¶
- Pressure-Absorption Redesign Workshop
- Each higher wall protected the town behind it but sent a sharper flood peak downstream — and, through the levee effect, drew more building into the "safe" floodplain
This sourceExplains the safe-development paradox: protection policies can promote development in hazardous protected areas and thereby increase catastrophic loss potential.
- Each higher wall protected the town behind it but sent a sharper flood peak downstream — and, through the levee effect, drew more building into the "safe" floodplain
Verification¶
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