Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma¶
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167-214.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Non-Zero-Sum Game
- In political science and international relations, alliances, treaties, and integration projects presume non-zero-sum potential, while arms races presume the opposite and systematically destroy joint value.
This sourceAnalyzes alliances, arms races, and the security dilemma as non-zero-sum strategic interactions where uncoordinated play destroys joint value.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Jervis supplies only the general frame that anarchy leaves states unable to realize common interests; he does not state the alliance/treaty or population-coevolution assertions.
“International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests.”
- In political science and international relations, alliances, treaties, and integration projects presume non-zero-sum potential, while arms races presume the opposite and systematically destroy joint value.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:aba1761d7aec · see in the full table