Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins

Bellovin, S. M. (1995). Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins. Proceedings of the 5th USENIX UNIX Security Symposium.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1995

Link

https://www.usenix.org/conference/5th-usenix-unix-security-symposium/using-domain-name-system-system-break-ins

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Mechanisms

• Name Resolution Service
  • Its failure modes cluster around trust in resolution: because resolvers accept an authority's answer, a forged or intercepted response can point a good name at a hostile locator

    This sourceShows how trusted DNS answers and forged responses can corrupt cached mappings and redirect a name to an attacker-controlled destination.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:ac38985a8713 · see in the full table