Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins¶
Bellovin, S. M. (1995). Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins. Proceedings of the 5th USENIX UNIX Security Symposium.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Name Resolution Service
- Its failure modes cluster around trust in resolution: because resolvers accept an authority's answer, a forged or intercepted response can point a good name at a hostile locator
This sourceShows how trusted DNS answers and forged responses can corrupt cached mappings and redirect a name to an attacker-controlled destination.
- Its failure modes cluster around trust in resolution: because resolvers accept an authority's answer, a forged or intercepted response can point a good name at a hostile locator
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