Agreeing to Disagree

Aumann, R. J. (1976). Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics, 4(6), 1236-1239.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1976

DOI

10.1214/aos/1176343654

Link

https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343654

Cited from

economics_finance, psychology

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Common Knowledge
  • A fact p is common knowledge among a group when every member knows p, every member knows that every member knows p, every member knows that, and so on recursively to arbitrary depth.

    This sourceGives the first formal definition of common knowledge and proves the agreement theorem, underwriting equilibrium and no-trade reasoning in game theory.

• Preference Heterogeneity and Conflict
  • Disagreement about means (Which policy best achieves our shared goal?) is often resolvable through technical analysis and comparative effectiveness, a position Aumann (1976) formalizes in his agreement theorem for common-knowledge Bayesians.

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