The Endurance of National Constitutions¶
Ginsburg, T., Melton, J., & Elkins, Z. (2010). The Endurance of National Constitutions. University of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 511.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Second-System Effect
- In constitutional and institutional redesign, the expected instance does not appear: national constitutions are short-lived — a mean life of about nineteen years — but the only systematic cross-national evidence runs the other way about what shortens them, finding that more flexible constitutions which include a wide range of social actors and provide some amount of detail endure longer than those that do not.
This sourceGinsburg, Tom, James Melton, and Zachary Elkins. "The Endurance of National Constitutions." University of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 511 (2010) — "more flexible constitutions that include a wide range of social actors and provide some amount of detail seem to endure longer than those that do not." Constitutions are short-lived (life expectancy about nineteen years), but detail and inclusiveness correlate with longer, not shorter, life — the reverse of what a second-system reading predicts.
- In constitutional and institutional redesign, the expected instance does not appear: national constitutions are short-lived — a mean life of about nineteen years — but the only systematic cross-national evidence runs the other way about what shortens them, finding that more flexible constitutions which include a wide range of social actors and provide some amount of detail endure longer than those that do not.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:ad12d016e981 · see in the full table