Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders¶
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
Cited by¶
7 citations across 7 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- which introduced the second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction) and showed truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy in it — a design result with vast implications, as Vickrey (1961) himself noted.
This sourceIntroduces the second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction and proves truthful bidding is weakly dominant
- which introduced the second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction) and showed truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy in it — a design result with vast implications, as Vickrey (1961) himself noted.
- Incentive Compatibility
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism — Vickrey (1961)
This sourceOriginal derivation of the second-price sealed-bid auction and proof that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy; foundational result in auction theory and dominant-strategy mechanism design.
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism — Vickrey (1961)
- Inversion
- Economics and auction design: Vickrey reverse auctions (Vickrey 1961) invert traditional ascending-bid auctions to sealed-bid second-price mechanism; second-price auction inverts incentive structure to produce truthful bidding.
This sourceOriginal derivation of the second-price sealed-bid auction and proof that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy; foundational result in auction theory and dominant-strategy mechanism design.
- Economics and auction design: Vickrey reverse auctions (Vickrey 1961) invert traditional ascending-bid auctions to sealed-bid second-price mechanism; second-price auction inverts incentive structure to produce truthful bidding.
- Mechanism Design
- These markets solve the binding problem: given decentralized generator costs and load values, aggregate them into clearing prices without a central planner having direct access to either.
This sourceOriginal derivation of the second-price sealed-bid auction and proof that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy; foundational result in auction theory and dominant-strategy mechanism design.
- These markets solve the binding problem: given decentralized generator costs and load values, aggregate them into clearing prices without a central planner having direct access to either.
- Pivotality
- In mechanism design, the pivotal bidder in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction pays the externality their presence imposes on others — structurally a pivotality calculation.
This sourceFoundational paper on the second-price (Vickrey) auction underlying VCG, where a pivotal bidder pays the externality its presence imposes on others.
- In mechanism design, the pivotal bidder in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction pays the externality their presence imposes on others — structurally a pivotality calculation.
- Selective Information Severance
- In economics and auction design, the double-blind and sealed-bid mechanisms sever the information that would enable collusion or strategic manipulation, and the design of markets routinely turns on what each party is prevented from knowing.
This sourceAnalyzes sealed-bid auctions in which each bidder is severed from rivals' bids, removing the information that would enable collusion or strategic manipulation.
- In economics and auction design, the double-blind and sealed-bid mechanisms sever the information that would enable collusion or strategic manipulation, and the design of markets routinely turns on what each party is prevented from knowing.
Domain-specific¶
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