Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.¶
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4(1), 25-55.
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Primes¶
- Nash Equilibrium
- Existence is guaranteed in mixed strategies even when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which is why the mixed extension is not a technical nicety but a foundational move. Refinements — subgame perfection, evolutionary stability, trembling-hand, sequential equilibrium — pick among Nash equilibria for different settings, so naming an outcome "Nash" is often the start of the analysis rather than the end.
This sourceIntroduces trembling-hand perfection, one of the refinements (with subgame perfection and sequential equilibrium) that select among Nash equilibria.
- Existence is guaranteed in mixed strategies even when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which is why the mixed extension is not a technical nicety but a foundational move. Refinements — subgame perfection, evolutionary stability, trembling-hand, sequential equilibrium — pick among Nash equilibria for different settings, so naming an outcome "Nash" is often the start of the analysis rather than the end.
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