Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic¶
Kripke, S. A. (1963). Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Minimal Modification Principle
- Modal logic and possible-worlds semantics: Formal logic treats possible worlds as a fundamental structure; minimal modification constrains which possible worlds count as "near" to actuality—only those differing minimally from the actual world are relevant to counterfactual truth, building on Kripke's (1963) semantics for modal logic.
This sourceFoundational possible-worlds semantics for modal logic; provides the formal framework on which Lewis-Stalnaker minimal-change semantics for counterfactuals is built.
- Modal logic and possible-worlds semantics: Formal logic treats possible worlds as a fundamental structure; minimal modification constrains which possible worlds count as "near" to actuality—only those differing minimally from the actual world are relevant to counterfactual truth, building on Kripke's (1963) semantics for modal logic.
- Modal Reasoning
- Its essential structural move, formalized by Kripke (1963) in his relational semantics for modal logic, is to introduce a modal operator (necessity, possibility, obligation, counterfactual conditional) that quantifies over alternatives and to ground the truth of a modal claim in the set of alternatives in which an inner proposition holds.
This sourceFoundational possible-worlds semantics for modal logic; provides the formal framework on which Lewis-Stalnaker minimal-change semantics for counterfactuals is built.
- Its essential structural move, formalized by Kripke (1963) in his relational semantics for modal logic, is to introduce a modal operator (necessity, possibility, obligation, counterfactual conditional) that quantifies over alternatives and to ground the truth of a modal claim in the set of alternatives in which an inner proposition holds.
Mechanisms¶
- Possible-World Case Matrix
- It is the natural home for the Kripke-style intuition that necessity is truth across all accessible worlds
This sourceGives Kripke-style semantics in which necessity at a world requires truth throughout the worlds accessible from it.
- It is the natural home for the Kripke-style intuition that necessity is truth across all accessible worlds
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