Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade¶
Greif, A. (1993). Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review, 83(3), 525-548.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Shadow Of The Future
- In medieval and pre-modern commerce, merchant coalitions sustained long-distance trade through reputation-based exclusion of cheaters in the absence of state enforcement.
This sourceDocuments reputation-based multilateral punishment sustaining long-distance trade among merchants absent state enforcement.
- In medieval and pre-modern commerce, merchant coalitions sustained long-distance trade through reputation-based exclusion of cheaters in the absence of state enforcement.
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