Social Choice and Individual Values

Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values.

Type

Unclassified

Intellectual base

Unclassified

Year

1963

Link

https://cowles.yale.edu/research/cowles-commission-monograph-no-12-social-choice-and-individual-values

Cited from

philosophy

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Nirvana Fallacy
  • Consider the argument that voting is a poor mechanism for collective choice because it is subject to manipulation, low information, and impossibility results, and therefore not legitimate.

    This sourceCowles Commission Monograph 12. New York: Wiley, 1951. Proves the impossibility theorem on aggregating individual preferences into a collective choice; cited for the claim that every feasible collective-choice mechanism has pathologies.

Domain-specific

• Compensation principle
  • The entry records a descriptive analytical identity; practical use requires the governing domain's evidence, standards, and safety obligations.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:b0d30a779ddf · see in the full table