Resource Allocation and the Public Sector.¶
Foley, D. K. (1967). Resource Allocation and the Public Sector. Yale Economic Essays, 7(1), 45-98.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Fairness
- Economics & finance: Fair allocation (Foley's (1967) envy-freeness criterion: no agent prefers another's bundle to their own); mechanism design (truthful revelation of preferences); price discrimination (charging different prices for different willingness-to-pay, or equal prices despite unequal benefit); fair division of contested goods (cake-cutting protocols, adjusted winner, envy-free procedures); tax progressivity as fairness principle.
This sourceIntroduces the no-envy / envy-freeness criterion of equity: an allocation is fair if no agent prefers another's bundle to their own. [No DOI for this 1967 journal; abstract page linked.]
- Economics & finance: Fair allocation (Foley's (1967) envy-freeness criterion: no agent prefers another's bundle to their own); mechanism design (truthful revelation of preferences); price discrimination (charging different prices for different willingness-to-pay, or equal prices despite unequal benefit); fair division of contested goods (cake-cutting protocols, adjusted winner, envy-free procedures); tax progressivity as fairness principle.
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Registry ID ref:b116287060a0 · see in the full table