A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.¶
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817-868.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Other-Regarding Preferences
- Competing formal models each propose a specific functional form for the cross-argument weights — inequity-aversion models use two parameters for the disutility of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, others use three, others a different two — and each can be evaluated against the same paradigm suite.
This sourceTwo-parameter inequity-aversion utility u_i = x_i − α·max(x_j−x_i,0) − β·max(x_i−x_j,0), with self-interest recovered at α=β=0.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Fehr & Schmidt's abstract states only that equity concerns resolve market and cooperation puzzles; it names no functional form, two-parameter weighting, or shared paradigm suite, so it backs the claim's frame alone.
“We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved.”
- Competing formal models each propose a specific functional form for the cross-argument weights — inequity-aversion models use two parameters for the disutility of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, others use three, others a different two — and each can be evaluated against the same paradigm suite.
Domain-specific¶
- Dictator Game
- Experimental economics — the home laboratory, where it is one of the four or five core paradigms (with the ultimatum, trust, public-goods, and prisoner's-dilemma games) and its allocation distribution is a portable workhorse dataset, comparable across labs and disaggregable by treatment. Behavioral game theory — where the modal positive transfer is a key empirical anchor for utility models augmented with inequity-aversion (Fehr-Schmidt, Bolton-Ockenfels), reciprocity, or warm-glow terms
This sourceThe Fehr-Schmidt inequity-aversion model, in which some people care about equity so that bargaining and voluntary-cooperation puzzles can be resolved, with the economic environment determining whether fair or selfish types dominate equilibrium behaviour.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
“We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.”
- Experimental economics — the home laboratory, where it is one of the four or five core paradigms (with the ultimatum, trust, public-goods, and prisoner's-dilemma games) and its allocation distribution is a portable workhorse dataset, comparable across labs and disaggregable by treatment. Behavioral game theory — where the modal positive transfer is a key empirical anchor for utility models augmented with inequity-aversion (Fehr-Schmidt, Bolton-Ockenfels), reciprocity, or warm-glow terms
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:b2b62052efcf · see in the full table