Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard¶
Anderson, R. W. (2002). Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard. Some Determinants of the Volatility of Futures Prices.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Peltzman Effect
- In finance and insurance, insured assets are managed less carefully than uninsured ones, and deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail backstops shift the risk preferences of guaranteed institutions — moral hazard is formally this pattern with explicit contracts.
This sourceEmpirical evidence that insured/guaranteed institutions take more risk and insured assets are managed less carefully — moral hazard from too-big-to-fail backstops.
- In finance and insurance, insured assets are managed less carefully than uninsured ones, and deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail backstops shift the risk preferences of guaranteed institutions — moral hazard is formally this pattern with explicit contracts.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:b4eab28e3bf4 · see in the full table