The First Collision for Full SHA-1.¶
Stevens, M., Bursztein, E., Karpman, P., Albertini, A., & Markov, Y. (2017). The First Collision for Full SHA-1. Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Injectivity
- The intervention catalog carries portable moves. Size the codomain to the expected domain with growth headroom and an adversarial factor (UUIDs versus sequential IDs, SHA-256 versus SHA-1).
This sourceDemonstrates a practical SHA-1 collision, the canonical case where a hash assumed injective-enough fails and certificate-authority trust is threatened.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Stevens et al. show practical hash collisions (MD5 rogue CA, SHA-1) undermining certificate and signature trust, but not the 'injective on the input distribution' framing.
“This eventually led to the forgery of a Rogue Certifi- cation Authority that in principle completely undermined HTTPS security”
- The intervention catalog carries portable moves. Size the codomain to the expected domain with growth headroom and an adversarial factor (UUIDs versus sequential IDs, SHA-256 versus SHA-1).
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