Reputation and imperfect information¶
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253-279.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Reputation
- Reputation thereby converts a series of nominally one-shot encounters into something with the strategic texture of a repeated game, the mechanism Kreps and Wilson (1982) formalized when they showed that even a small probability of being a "tough" or honest type can sustain cooperative play in finitely repeated games.
This sourceShows that even a small probability of a "committed" type can sustain cooperative play in finitely repeated games — the formal reputation effect.
- Reputation thereby converts a series of nominally one-shot encounters into something with the strategic texture of a repeated game, the mechanism Kreps and Wilson (1982) formalized when they showed that even a small probability of being a "tough" or honest type can sustain cooperative play in finitely repeated games.
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Registry ID ref:b53c7c8572a9 · see in the full table