Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients.¶
Nichols, A. L., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1982). Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients. American Economic Review.
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Primes¶
- Screening
- Means-tested social programs with deliberately awkward application processes are often criticized as bureaucratic; screening theory suggests some of the friction is a deliberate screening device — the public-economics term of art is an ordeal mechanism (Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982
This sourceClassical introduction of ordeal mechanisms — deliberately costly participation requirements as screening devices that improve targeting of transfers by inducing self-selection on unobservable need.
- Means-tested social programs with deliberately awkward application processes are often criticized as bureaucratic; screening theory suggests some of the friction is a deliberate screening device — the public-economics term of art is an ordeal mechanism (Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982
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