The Take-up of Social Benefits.¶
Currie, J. (2004). The Take-up of Social Benefits. Public Policy and the Distribution of Income.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Invisible Affordance
- Statutory rights and public-service uptake: legal remedies unused for decades despite being published and indexed, and free services (vaccination, hotlines, legal aid) reaching their population at low rates because announcement surfaces are not sampled surfaces.
This sourceIn Alan Auerbach, David Card, and John Quigley, eds., Public Policy and the Income Distribution. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006: 80-148. Surveys evidence that eligible populations fail to claim benefits and use free public services at low rates, with lack of information/awareness (announcement not reaching the eligible population) a leading cause.
- Statutory rights and public-service uptake: legal remedies unused for decades despite being published and indexed, and free services (vaccination, hotlines, legal aid) reaching their population at low rates because announcement surfaces are not sampled surfaces.
- Screening
- Empirical work on welfare take-up (Currie 2006
This sourceSurvey establishing that administrative barriers and transaction costs materially reduce take-up of welfare benefits and that automatic or default enrollment tends to raise take-up.
- Empirical work on welfare take-up (Currie 2006
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