Algorithmic Game Theory¶
Nisan, N. (2007). Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Incentive Compatibility
- In algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen's (1999) paper Algorithmic Mechanism Design launched a subfield insisting that computational tractability must accompany IC in real deployments — synthesized in the textbook treatment of Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani (2007)
This sourceCanonical textbook synthesizing algorithmic mechanism design and incentive compatibility for computer science.
- In algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen's (1999) paper Algorithmic Mechanism Design launched a subfield insisting that computational tractability must accompany IC in real deployments — synthesized in the textbook treatment of Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani (2007)
- Price of Anarchy
- - Not `mechanism_design`. Mechanism design is the constructive activity of building rules whose equilibria implement desired outcomes.
This sourceStandard reference defining mechanism design as constructing rules whose equilibria implement desired outcomes, and the price of anarchy as its evaluative complement.
- - Not `mechanism_design`. Mechanism design is the constructive activity of building rules whose equilibria implement desired outcomes.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:b7354482a9b8 · see in the full table